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PROVABILITY AND INTERPRETABILITY LOGICS WITH
RESTRICTED REALIZATIONS
THOMAS F. ICARD AND JOOST J. JOOSTEN
Abstract. The provability logic of a theory T is the set of modal formulas,
which under any arithmetical realization are provable in T . We slightly modify
this notion by requiring the arithmetical realizations to come from a specified
set Γ. We make an analogous modification for interpretability logics. This is
a paper from 2012.
We first studied provability logics with restricted realizations, and show
that for various natural candidates of theory T and restriction set Γ, where
each sentence in Γ has a well understood (meta)-mathematical content in T ,
the result is the logic of linear frames. However, for the theory Primitive
Recursive Arithmetic (PRA), we define a fragment that gives rise to a more
interesting provability logic, by capitalizing on the well-studied relationship
between PRA and IΣ1.
We then study interpretability logics, obtaining some upper bounds for
IL(PRA), whose characterization remains a major open question in inter-
pretability logic. Again this upper bound is closely relatively to linear frames.
The technique is also applied to yield the non-trivial result that IL(PRA) ⊂
ILM.
1. Introduction
In a recent discussion on a mailing list on the foundations of mathematics1 Joe
Shipman asked for important theorems that have essentially only one proof. In re-
ply, Giovanni Sambin provided the example of Solovay’s arithmetical completeness
theorem of the provability logic GL ([33]).
This paper deals with restricted cases of Solovay’s theorem where alternative
proof-methods are available. One of the broad motivations for this paper is the hope
of obtaining an alternative proof of Solovay’s Theorem (see Section 7). However,
the method of provability logics with restricted realizations, we feel, merits interest
in its own right, as we shall explain shortly. Let us first briefly restate Solovay’s
Completeness Theorem, which is the cornerstone result in the study of provability
logics.
1.1. Provability Logics. The propositional modal logic GL, known as Go¨del-Lo¨b
Logic, captures exactly the behavior of the standard provability predicate in arith-
metic. For a given theory T (e.g. Peano Arithmetic), formulas ✷A are interpreted
as, “A is provable in T ”. It is defined by extending the basic modal logic K with
a schematic formalization of Lo¨b’s Theorem (L in the following definition).
1FOM mailing list, 8/19/2009, http://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2009-August/013994.html
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Definition 1.1. GL is given by all boolean tautologies, in addition to all instances
of the following schemata
K : ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B);
L : ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A.
The logic is closed under modus ponens and necessitation.
GL enjoys modal completeness with respect to a simple class of frames, in par-
ticular the class of finite, irreflexive, and transitive frames, which we henceforth
refer to as GL-frames. The logic is linked to formalized provability via arithmetical
realizations. An arithmetical realization is a function ∗ that maps propositional
variables to sentences in the language of (a given) arithmetic, sending ⊥ to 0 = 1.
A realization ∗ can be extended uniformly so that we can interpret an arbitrary
modal formula as an arithmetical formula by stipulating,
(A→ B)∗ = A∗ → B∗
(✷A)∗ = BewT (pA
∗
q).
Here p·q is a function that maps a formula ϕ to its code pϕq and BewT (·) is a
predicate in the language of T formalizing provability in T , so that T ⊢ ϕ just in
case N  BewT (pϕq).
We define PL(T ), the provability logic of a theory T , as follows
PL(T ) := {A | ∀ ∗ T ⊢ A∗}.
Since Lo¨b ([27]) it is known that GL is sound for a large class of theories T , that
is, GL ⊆ PL(T). The reverse inclusion is Solovay’s completeness result.
Theorem 1.2 (Solovay’s Theorem). PL(T ) = GL for a wide range of theories T .
For soundness, i.e. GL⊆PL(T ), the theory can be as weak as I∆0 + Ω1 or
equivalently Buss’s S12 (see [8] and [12]). Arithmetical completeness, i.e. that
PL(T ) ⊆GL, is known to hold for any sound2 theory extending I∆0 + exp (see
[22]).
Solovay proved that whenever GL 0 A, there is a realization ∗ so that PA 0 A∗.
An outline of the proof runs as follows. First, a modal countermodel M in the
form of a rooted tree is taken that witnesses GL 0 A. Next, a new root is added
to this model. A primitive recursive function f on this model is defined in terms of
its own provable limit behavior. This definition is made using an arithmetical fixed
point. The function f starts in the newly added root and f(x) remains where it is
unless x is a proof that the function does not have the node y, which is accessible
from x, as a limit, in which case the function jumps to y. If T is a sound theory,
the function must stay where it started, in the newly added root. The realization
∗ is defined as a disjunction of the limit-statements λy of the function f , where λy
says “y is the limit of f”. More specifically p∗ :=
∨
M,yp λy.
1.2. Restricted Realizations. This ingenious proof thus gives us the concrete
realization ∗. However, the arithmetical content of this realization ∗ is not exactly
transparent.3 A natural question to ask is whether we can find translations with
more clear arithmetical and proof theoretic content. And conversely, given a set of
2Σ1-sound is sufficient here.
3There is a paper by de Jongh, Jumelet and Montagna [22] where an alternative proof of Solo-
vay’s theorem is given. In that proof, using the diagonal lemma, one finds some sentences with the
required properties rather than defining the sentences and then proving the necessary properties.
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arithmetical sentences with a clear arithmetical content, what modal logics results
from restricting realizations to this particular set? These questions motivate the
following definition. We shall write, par abus de langage, ∗ ∈ Γ to mean that the
realization ∗ takes on all its values within the set of sentences Γ.
Definition 1.3. PLΓ(T ) := {A : ∀∗ ∈ Γ, T ⊢ A
∗}
Notice that in a strict sense, PLΓ(T ) need not even be a logic as in general it is
not closed under substitution. From the definition the following lemma is evident.
Lemma 1.4. If Γ ⊆ ∆, then PL∆(T ) ⊆ PLΓ(T ).
Clearly, by taking Γ to be the set of all arithmetical sentences we get PL∆(T ) =
PL(T ). For a large class of theories however, we can improve this to the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.5. For all those theories T for which Solovay’s Theorem 1.2 can be
proved using the original proof we have that
PLB(Σ1)(T ) ⊆ PL(T ).
Here, B(Σ1) denotes the class of Boolean combinations of Σ1 sentences.
Proof. By close inspection of the proof of Solovay’s theorem, we see that all substi-
tutions are disjunctions of limit statements. It is clear that for elementary functions
h, the statement “h has a limit” can be expressed in a Σ2 fashion. However, as
Albert Visser pointed out to us, the statement “h has limit i” which is only actually
needed in Solovay’s proof, can be expressed as B(Σ1):
[∃x h(x) = i] ∧ [∀y, z ((y ≤ z ∧ hy = i)→ h(z) = i)] .
Taking disjunctions of those sentences will of course not get us out of the class
B(Σ1). 
The simple Lemma 1.4 can be used to establish upperbounds for a provability
logic if one is unable to find the full provability logic. For example, it is a long
standing open question what the provability logic is of bounded arithmetics such
as S1
2
.4
1.3. Applications and plan of the paper. One can thus use Γ to study the
provability logic of T . On the other hand, we shall see that PLΓ(T ) can also be
used to characterize the fragment Γ. For example, in Theorem 2.1 below we consider
the closed fragment B of provability logic, which consists of boolean combinations
of iterated (in)consistency statements. This fragment is given by the following
grammar.
B := ⊥ | B → B | ✷B.
We shall see that the modal formulas valid under all realizations from this fragment
are exactly the formulas valid on all finite strict linear orders. This can be said
However, the obtained sentences are essentially the same as the ones defined in Solovay’s original
proof.
4This question has been studied in depth in [8]. The question also has important connections
to matters in computational complexity. For example, it is shown in [12] that if S1
2
proves Πb1-
completeness with parameters (Πb1 is the set of formulas (∀x ≤ t) θ with θ sharply bounded), then
NP = coNP.
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to provide yet further evidence that reflection principles and iterated consistency
statements are inherently linearly ordered.
Moreover, this fact also gives us information on what kind of arithmetical fixed
point constructions are needed in the proof of Theorem 1.2. By the modal Fixed
Point Theorem, independently due to de Jongh and Sambin (see [30] (de Jongh
actually never published his proof)), we know that certain applications of the arith-
metical fixed point theorem can be dispensed with. More precisely, if we have a
formula A(x) where the x only occurs directly under the scope of a BewT predicate
then applying the fixed point to this formula does not give us new expressive power.
That is, if we can prove B ↔ A(pBq) then B is actually provably equivalent to a
formula in the language of provability logic. Thus, these sort of applications of the
arithmetical fixed point theorem only yield formulas in B, whence, pace Theorem
3.2, cannot suffice for a proof of Solovay’s completeness result, Theorem 1.2.
Another example of restricting the substitutions is known in the literature. In
[35] Visser studied the provability logic that arises when restricting substitutions
to Σ1 sentences.
In Section 4 we shall consider a fragment D which contains infinitely many copies
of B for increasingly strong provability predicates. It turns out that even for this
richer fragment we do not move beyond linear frames (cf. Theorem 4.5). However,
in Section 5 we shall see that there is a natural fragment for PRA whose associated
provability logic lies strictly in between the logic of linear frames and GL.
In Section 8 we shall see how restricted realizations can also be applied to inter-
pretability logics.
2. Fragments and Logics
In this section we show that certain conditions on a given fragment translate to
a semantic characterization of the corresponding restricted provability logics. First,
some preliminaries on basic relational semantics for provability logics.
Recall that a frame F for GL is an ordered pair 〈W,R〉, where W is a set of
points and R ⊆ W ×W is a finite, irreflexive, and transitive relation. Given a set
Prop of propositional variables, a model M based on F is a triple 〈W,R, V 〉, where
V : Prop → ℘(W ) is a valuation function assigning to each variable the set of the
points where it is true. We shall also write V for the straightforward extension
of V to arbitrary modal formulas. We then write 〈W,R, V 〉, w  A, just in case
w ∈ V (A). We write 〈W,R, V 〉  A if A ∈ V (w) for all w ∈ W . Overloading
notation, we also write 〈W,R〉  A, if 〈W,R, V 〉  A for all V . We say A is valid in
the model and in the frame, respectively.
When dealing with fragments, however, arbitrary variables will not be present.
All of the fragments we shall consider in this paper will extend the fragment B de-
fined above, by adding constants σ1, σ2, σ3, ..., with some clear arithmetical content.
As these constants will be fixed, and as we would like to characterize the sentences
in this fragment modally, we shall add constants s1, s2, s3, ..., to our modal lan-
guage, and correspondingly extend the definition of a realization to ensure that
(si)
∗ = σi. In fact, given this convention, we will be able to define our fragments
in a single language and throughout treat each constant simultaneously as a con-
stant in the modal language and as a specified arithmetical formula, disambiguating
whenever the distinction is not clear from context. In other words, we will usually
not distinguish between A and A∗.
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On the other hand, as far as the relational semantics is concerned, the con-
stants s1, s2, s3, ... are simply treated as variables. Therefore the above notation is
extended in the obvious way to this setting.
Suppose we would like to obtain a modal characterization of PLF (T ). Under
certain circumstances, it suffices to know how F is characterized according to T .
To be precise, if we have a modelM based on a frame F, such that for each A ∈ F ,
the following condition holds:
(1) T ⊢ A ⇔ M  A,
then, as is shown in Theorem 2.1 below, PLF (T ) = L(F). Here, L(F) is the set
of formulas in the basic modal language (with propositional variables) valid on the
frame F.
There are two side conditions to our theorem. One of them involves image-
finiteness. We call a model image-finite if {y : xRy} is finite for each x. We shall
denote the set {y : xRy} ∪ {x} by x ↑. Our theorem thus reads as follows:
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that (1) holds for a model M based on frame F. Suppose
moreover that M is image-finite and that each point x ∈ M is uniquely definable
by a formula Dx ∈ F . Then, we have that PLF (T ) = L(F).
Proof. In the light of (1) it suffices to prove that
∀ ∗ ∈ F , M  B∗ ⇔ F  B.
⇐ Consider some arbitrary ∗ ∈ F and define V∗(p) := {i : M, i  p
∗}. By
induction on A we see that for each i ∈ F
〈F, V∗〉, i  A ⇔ M, i  A[p/p
∗]
and we are done.
⇒ Given some i ∈ F and some arbitrary valuation V we define ∗ by
p∗ :=
∨
x∈V (p)∩i↑
Dx.
As the frame is image-finite, the disjunction is finite. By an induction5 on
C we see again that
〈F, V 〉, i  C ⇔ M, i  C∗.
As i was arbitrary, we see that F  C.

As we shall see below, in many occasions we actually will have something stronger
than (1). In particular we shall often find ourselves in a situation where we have,
apart from the frame, also a modal logic L for which we have
T ⊢ A ⇔ L ⊢ A ⇔ M  A.
This logic L will facilitate our calculations considerably.
5In order to get the inductive step for the ✷ operator going we should prove the slightly stronger
statement that for all j ∈ i ↑ we have 〈F, V 〉, j  C ⇔ M, j  C∗.
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3. The Closed Fragment
With Theorem 2.1 we can calculate our first provability logic with restricted
substitutions. Recall the definition of the closed fragment B in Subsection 1.3.
Definition 3.1. GL.3 is the logic GL together with the linearity axiom:
✷(✷A→ B) ∨ ✷(✷+B → A).
Here and below, ✷+A is short for A ∧ ✷A.
Theorem 3.2. PLB(T )= GL.3 for a large class
6 of theories T .
Proof. It is well known that the truth of a closed formula at a particular point
in a model depends solely on the rank of that point. Here, the rank of a point x
is defined as the supremum of lengths of paths leading from x to a leaf. See for
example Chapter 7 from [11].
Thus, the linear frame 〈ω,>〉 is universal for B in the sense that if a formula
ϕ ∈ B is false at some point in some frame, then it is actually false at some point
in 〈ω,>〉. Thus, by Theorem 1.2, we have T ⊢ A ⇔ 〈ω,>〉  A.
Furthermore, it is known that the logic of the frame 〈ω,>〉 is axiomatized by
GL.3. (See, for example, Chapter 13 of [11].) Thus, 〈ω,>〉  A ⇔ GL.3 ⊢ A and
Condition 1 is satisfied for any model based on 〈ω,>〉.
Note that 〈ω,>〉 is image-finite and that the point n is defined by ✸n⊤∧✷n+1⊥.
Thus, by Theorem 2.1 we have our result. 
4. Substitutions from the Closed Fragment of GLP
Japaridze’s Logic GLP ([20]) describes all of the universally valid schemata for
reflection principles of restricted logical complexity in arithmetic. It is formulated
in a language with infinitely many modalities, where [n]A is read arithmetically as,
A is provable from T along with all true Πn sentences.
Arithmetical completeness with respect to this interpretation was proven in [19],
for sound theories containing only a modest amount of arithmetic.
Definition 4.1. GLP is given by the following axiom schemata,
(i) All boolean tautologies;
(ii) [n]([n]A→ A)→ [n]A, for all n;
(iii) [m]A→ [n]A, for m ≤ n;
(iii) 〈m〉A→ [n]〈m〉A, for m < n;
in addition to the rules of modus ponens and necessitation for each [n].
While GLP does not admit of any frame semantics, various other models have
been given (see, e.g. [3] and [4]). In particular, Ignatiev [19] has defined a universal
frame for the closed fragment of GLP, denoted GLP0, which will be of use.
7
Define D to be the fragment given by the following infinite grammar:
D := ⊥ | D → D | [0]D | [1]D | [2]D | ...
6See Footnote 2 on conditions on theories. The current proof of this theorem invokes Solovay’s
completeness result, Theorem 1.2, in full. However, in [23] it is shown how we can substitute the
use of Solovay’s completeness result by the proof of Theorem 2.1. Thus, Theorem 3.2 actually
holds for a larger class of theories including I∆0 + Ω1.
7This frame is studied in detail in [5] and [17].
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That is, GLP0 is simply GLP restricted to the fragment D, with no variables.
We can describe Ignatiev’s universal frame for GLP0 as follows. Let Ω consist
of the set of ω-sequences of ordinals (α0, α1, α2, ...), where each αi < ǫ0. Recall ǫ0
is the least fixed point of the equation ωα = α. If the Cantor Normal Form of α is
ωλn + ...+ ωλ1 , then let e(α) := λ1 and set e(0) = 0.
Definition 4.2. Ignatiev’s universal frame is defined as U := 〈U, {Rn}n<ω〉, with,
U := {~α ∈ Ω : ∀i < ω, αi+1 ≤ e(αi)};
~αRn~β :⇔ (∀m < n,αm = βm & αn > βn).
Notice that each point in U can be seen as a finite, strictly decreasing sequence
of ordinals less than ǫ0, as each sequence ends in an infinite tail of zeros. For a
visualization of the frame, see Figure 1.
A point of the form (α, e(α), e(e(α)), ...), where αi+1 = e(αi) for all i, is called a
root point, and is denoted by α̂ when α is the first coordinate. Thus every coordinate
of α̂ is uniquely determined by α. The following lemma is then obvious, given the
definition of U .
Lemma 4.3. If α̂ and β̂ are root points, then either α̂R0β̂, β̂R0α̂, or α̂ = β̂.
In addition to the more routine soundness, the following strong completeness
theorem has also been proven using several different methods in the works cited
above.
Theorem 4.4. If GLP0 0 A, then there is a root point α̂ ∈ U , such that U , α̂ 2 A.
With these results we can now show that even with this much richer fragment
the resulting provability logic is exactly the same as for the fragment with only the
single ✷-operator (c.f. Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 4.5. PLD(PRA) = GL.3.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, by Lemma 1.4 and by observing that ✷ is just [0], it is
clear that PLD(PRA) ⊆ GL.3. For the other inclusion, we must show, under the
arithmetical interpretation,
PRA ⊢ ✷(✷A→ B) ∨✷(✷+B → A),
for any A,B ∈ D. However, this follows by arithmetical completeness and by the
universality of Ignatiev’s frame.
For, suppose U , ~α  ✸(✷A ∧ ¬B) ∧✸(✷+B ∧ ¬A), for some ~α. By Theorem 4.4
there are root points β̂ and γ̂, such that U , β̂  ✷A ∧ ¬B, and U , γ̂  ✷+B ∧ ¬A.
By Lemma 4.3, either β̂R0γ̂, γ̂R0β̂, or β̂ = γ̂. All three lead to contradiction. 
5. Non-Linear GL-frames
Theorems 3.2 and 4.5 suggest that it may not be straightforward to define a
fragment whose associated restricted provability logic is anything other than GL.3
or just GL. In this section we fill in this gap by giving some sufficient conditions
on constants, so that we obtain logics of non-linear GL-frames. We will be working
with generic fragments Fn, with some finite number n of constants:
Fn := s1 | s2 | ... | sn | ⊥ | Fn → Fn | ✷Fn
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...
...
...
...
...
...
...
· · ·
0
1(= 〈1, 0〉)
2
〈ω, 0〉
ω + 1
ω + 2
〈ω + ω, 0〉
〈ω2, 0〉
ω2 + 1
〈ω2 + ω, 0〉
ωω + 1
〈ωω+1, 0〉
ωω+1 + 1
〈ω, 1〉
〈ωω , 0〉
〈ω2, 2〉
〈ω2, 1〉
〈ω + ω, 1〉
〈ω2 + ω, 1〉
〈ωω, 1〉〈ωω, 2〉
· · ·
〈ωω , ω, 0〉
〈ωω+1, 1〉
〈ωω+1, 2〉〈ωω+1, ω, 0〉
〈ωω+1, ω + 1〉
〈ωω+1, ω, 1〉
〈ωω, ω, 1〉
Figure 1. The universal model for GLP0
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As before, we will be viewing formulas in Fn simultaneously as arithmetical formu-
las, where each si is a specified formula in the language of arithmetic and ✷ is the
standard provability predicate, and as modal formulas, where each si is interpreted
as a constant and ✷ is a normal modal operator.
5.1. Fragments, Logics and Models. Let ~si stand for the sentence
∧
j∈J sj+1 ∧∧
k∈K ¬sk+1, where J is the set of places in the binary expansion for i with value
1, and K is the complement of J in {0, . . . , i − 1}. Then we define the following
class of logics.
Definition 5.1. The logic FGLn is formulated in the language Fn and thus, con-
tains no propositional variables. The axioms and rules are specified by the axioms
and rules of GL together with the list of the 2n many axioms below, one axiom for
each Boolean combination of the si. The B in these axioms stands for any formula
that is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ✷α⊥, where α < ω + 1 and
✷
ω⊥ := ⊤.
✷( ~s0 → B)→ ✷B;
...
✷( ~s2n−1 → B)→ ✷B.
These logics FGLn come with an associated model, based on the following
frames:
Definition 5.2. The frame Gn := 〈Gn, Rn〉, where Gn := {〈m, i〉 : m ∈ ω, i < 2
n},
and 〈m, i〉Rn〈p, j〉 just in case p < m.
The associated model defined on this frame is given via the binary expansion,
where Jj is given as above, relative to j.
Definition 5.3. G•n is the triple 〈Gn, Rn, Vn〉, where Vn(sj) = {〈m, i〉 : i ∈ Jj}.
For a visualization of G•1, see Figure 2.
Theorem 5.4. For all formulas A ∈ Fn, FGLn ⊢ A, if and only if G
•
n  A.
Proof Sketch. The full proof for the case of F1 is established in [24]. Here we give
a sketch for the general case. Soundness is routine. For completeness, we use the
following two lemmata.
Lemma 5.5. Each A ∈ Fn is equivalent in FGLn to a Boolean combination of
formulas of the form s1,..., sn, or ✷
α⊥. In particular FGLn ⊢ ✷A ↔ ✷
α⊥ for
some α < ω + 1.
Lemma 5.6. If FGLn ⊢ ✷A, then FGLn ⊢ A.
These lemmata are straightforwardly proven by manipulation of modal normal
forms. Completeness is then clear. If FGLn 0 A, then by Lemma 5.6, FGLn 2 ✷A,
and by Lemma 5.5, FGLn ⊢ ✷A↔ ✷
α⊥, for some α < ω (in particular α 6= ω). By
soundness, for any point 〈m, i〉 ∈ Gn we know G
•
n, 〈m, i〉  ✷A↔ ✷
α⊥. Certainly
G
•
n, 〈α, 0〉 2 ✷
α⊥, so G•n, 〈α, 0〉 2 ✷A. That, in turn, means for some 〈β, j〉 with
β < α, we have G•n, 〈β, j〉  ¬A. So A is falsified on G
•
n. 
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〈3, 0〉
〈1, 0〉
〈0, 0〉
〈1, 1〉  S
〈2, 1〉  S
〈3, 1〉  S
〈2, 0〉
...
〈0, 1〉  S
Figure 2. The model G•1
5.2. Conditions for completeness. Suppose we have a given theory T and some
fragment Fn, and we would like a characterization of PLFn(T ). In Section 2 we
showed that if condition (1) holds for some logic L and model M, then Theorem
2.1 will follow. Recall Condition (1):
T ⊢ A ⇔ L ⊢ A ⇔ M  A.
To show (1) holds for this case, one merely needs to show arithmetical soundness
and completeness of L for T . However, given Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6, arithmetical
completeness of L depends only on arithmetical soundness of L.
To see this, suppose FGLn 2 A. Then by Lemma 5.5, FGLn 2 ✷A. Since
FGLn  ✷A ↔ ✷
α⊥, for α 6= ω, as long as we have soundness of L, T ⊢ ✷A ↔
✷
α⊥, under the arithmetical interpretation. Now, if moreover T is a sound theory
in the sense that it does not prove any false statements we get T 0 ✷A, from which
it follows T 0 A.
Consequently, the following is a corollary of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 5.4. Note
that both image finiteness and definability of the states in the model G•n are evident.
Corollary 5.7. PLFn(T ) = L(Gn) whenever [FGLn ⊢ A ⇒ T ⊢ A.]
In Section 6, we shall see that each of these frames Gn has a simple axiomati-
zation. For the rest of this section, we exhibit a suitable constant for the case of
F1.
5.3. A Constant for IΣ1. Recall IΣ1 is the theory Q ([34]) along with induction
over Σ1 formulas. This theory is finitely axiomatizable, so let σ stand for the
sentence axiomatizing it. We then define the fragment Q as a special case of F1:
Q := σ | ⊥ | Q → Q | ✷Q
Our theory T will be Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA), essentially just Q with
function symbols for all of the primitive recursive functions and induction over ∆0
PROVABILITY AND INTERPRETABILITY LOGICS WITH RESTRICTED REALIZATIONS11
formulas. The relationship between IΣ1 and PRA is well studied and understood
([28], [29], [1]). By Corollary 5.7, we need to show that FGLn is sound with respect
to PRA. It is already well known that PL(PRA) = GL, so certainly all the axioms
and rules of GL are sound. We need only observe the following also hold:
(i) PRA ⊢ ✷(σ → B)→ ✷B,
(ii) PRA ⊢ ✷(¬σ → B)→ ✷B.
In fact, item (i) is a direct consequence of what is known as Parson’s Theorem
(named after Charles Parsons, but discovered independently by Grigori Mints and
Gaisi Takeuti), which says that IΣ1 is Π2-conservative over PRA. In [1] it is shown
that this theorem is in fact formalizable in PRA, which gives us (i).
Theorem 5.8 (Parson’s Theorem). PRA ⊢ ∀Π2B (✷(σ → B)→ ✷B).
So this certainly holds for B(Σ1) formulas consisting of Boolean combinations
of formulas of the form ✷α⊥. As for (ii), it is shown in [24] that the negation of
the sentence axiomatizing IΣ1 is Π3-conservative over PRA. That is, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 5.9. PRA ⊢ ∀Π3B (✷(¬σ → B)→ ✷B).
Thus, we can state the following corollary:
Corollary 5.10. PLQ(PRA) = L(G1).
While the logic GL.3 of the linear frame G0 is well known, that of G1 is not.
Therefore in the following section we provide a simple axiomatization. Our work
can then be generalized to arbitrary Gn.
6. The Logic of G1
6.1. The Modal Logic GL.4 and its corresponding class of frames. We
define GL.4 to be the normal modal logic obtained by adding to GL the following
two axiom schemata:
Q1. ✷(✷A→ (B ∨ C)) ∨ ✷(✷+B → (A ∨C)) ∨ ✷(✷+C → (A ∨B));
Q2. ✸(✸A ∧ ✷B)→ ✷(✸A ∨B).
GL.4 in fact defines a natural class of frames. We define C to be the class
satisfying the following properties:
C1. Finite, irreflexive and transitive;
C2. Non-triple branching: (xRy & xRz & xRw)⇒
(wRy ∨ yRw ∨ zRw ∨ wRz ∨ yRz ∨ zRy ∨ w = y ∨ z = y ∨ w = z);
C3. Strongly confluent: (xRy & xRz & yRw)⇒ (zRw ∨ wRz ∨ yRz).
Theorem 6.1. GL.4 is sound and complete with respect to C.
Soundness is proven as usual by induction on complexity of proofs. As for
completeness, we shall appeal to the canonical model of GL.4 (see Definition 4.18
of [10]). In particular we use the finite filtration method to transform the canonical
model into a model in the class C.
Recall the canonical model M of GL.4 is the triple, 〈WGL.4, RGL.4, V GL.4〉 with
• WGL.4 is the set of maximal GL.4-consistent sets;
• For Γ,∆ ∈ WGL.4, define ΓRGL.4∆ if for all φ ∈ ∆ we have ✸φ ∈ Γ;
• V (p) = {Γ : p ∈ Γ}, for propositional variables p.
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First, we make some key observations about this model, the verifications of which
are straightforward.
Lemma 6.2. C2 holds on M.
Lemma 6.3. C3 holds on M.
In fact, these follow by the fact that axiom Q1 is canonical for property C2, as is
axiom Q2 for C3 (see [10], Definition 4.31). Thus, it remains to show that we can
transform the underlying frame of M into a finite partial order, while preserving
validity of formulas.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Suppose that GL.4 0 A, for some formula A. We would
like to find a maximal consistent set Γ such that (✷A ∧ ¬A) ∈ Γ, so that Γ is an
‘irreflexive’ point in the canonical model.
By the fact that A is not a theorem, we are guaranteed of some ∆ ∈ WGL.4
such that A /∈ ∆. If ✷A ∈ ∆, then set Γ := ∆. Otherwise, since ¬✷A ∈ ∆, by
the contrapositive form of Lo¨b’s Theorem ✸(✷A∧¬A) ∈ ∆. Thus by the so-called
‘Existence Lemma’ ([10], Lemma 4.20) for normal modal logics, ∆ is RGL.4-related
to some Σ for which (✷A ∧ ¬A) ∈ Σ. In that case, set Γ := Σ.
Either way we have some Γ with (✷A ∧ ¬A) ∈ Γ. Notice also, if ✷C is a
subformula of A, and ✷C /∈ Γ, then by the same argument there is some ‘irreflexive’
∆ such that ΓRGL.4∆ and that (✷C ∧ ¬C) ∈ ∆. Moreover, by Lemma 6.2 there
are at most two distinct such ∆.
With these observations in place, our filtrated model M′ = 〈W,R, V 〉 will be
defined as a submodel of M:
(i) W := {Γ} ∪ {∆ : ΓRGL.4∆, and there is ✷C subsentence of A, such that
(✷C ∧ ¬C) ∈ ∆ and ¬✷C ∈ Γ};
(ii) R is just RGL.4 restricted to points in W ;
(iii) V (p) := V GL.4(p) ∩W .
The modelM′ satisfies C2, C3, and transitivity simply becauseM does. It is clearly
finite. And irreflexivity, as hinted above, follows from the fact that each point inW
was chosen to contain some formulas ✷C and ¬C, ensuring the point is not related
to itself. It follows M′ is in C.
The standard ‘Truth Lemma’ is then proven by induction:
Lemma 6.4. If ∆ ∈W and B is a subsentence of A, then B ∈ ∆ iff M′,∆  B.
Concluding the proof, since A /∈ Γ, we have that M′,Γ 2 A. 
6.2. The Class C and the Frame G1. We must now show that GL.4 is the logic
of the frame G1.
Recall a p-morphism from F = 〈W,R〉 to F′ = 〈W ′, R′〉 is a function f :W →W ′,
such that xRy implies f(x)R′f(y); and if f(x)R′y′ then there is some y ∈ W such
that f(y) = y′ and xRy. The following theorem is standard:8
Theorem 6.5. If there is a p-morphism from F to F′, then the existence of a
valuation V ′ and point w′ ∈W ′ such that 〈F′, V ′〉, w′ 2 A, ensures the existence of
a valuation V and point w ∈W , such that 〈F, V 〉, w 2 A.
To demonstrate that GL.4 is the logic of G1, we use the following proposition:
8See, e.g. [10], Definition 3.13, where p-morphisms go under the name bounded morphism.
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Proposition 6.6. For any frame F ∈ C and any point x in F, there is some point
〈m, i〉 in G1, such that there exists a p-morphism from the subframe generated by
〈m, i〉 to the subframe generated by x.
In other words, falsifiability is reflected by p-morphisms, which gives us the
following corollary of Proposition 6.6 and improvement upon Corollary 5.10.
Corollary 6.7. PLQ(PRA) = GL.4.
It remains only to verify Proposition 6.6.
Proof Sketch of Proposition 6.6. The proof proceeds by induction on the number
of points in a frame in C. The basic case is obvious. Supposing we have a frame
with one point, say x, then consider the subframe generated by 〈0, 0〉, and the
p-morphism mapping 〈0, 0〉 to x.
Supposing we have a frame in C with n + 1 points, consider the subframe
F = 〈W,R〉 generated by some point x ∈ C. We would like to use the induc-
tive hypothesis to obtain a p-morphism to some subframe of F containing ≤ n
points, and extend it to all of F. To do this we consider three cases: (i) x has
no successors; (ii) x has one immediate successor (i.e. point y such that xRy and
there is no z with xRzRy); and (iii) x has two immediate successors. More than 2
immediate successors is ruled out by property C2.
Case (i) is trivial. For case (ii), let F′ be F without the point x, and let y be
the unique immediate successor of x. Then since F′ ∈ C and it has n points, we
have a p-morphism f from the subframe generated by some point 〈m, i〉 in G1 to
F′, the subframe generated by y. We then consider the subframe generated by
〈m + 1, i〉 instead, and extend the p-morphism f so that f(〈m + 1, i〉) = x and
f(〈m, i− 1〉) = y.
Verifying case (iii) is similar, except that instead of removing the point x, we
must remove the ‘maximal’ points of F. Then the p-morphism obtained by inductive
hypothesis is extended by shifting each point in the morphism by one. Thus, e.g.
if 〈m, i〉 is mapped to y, then in the new mapping 〈m+ 1, i〉 is mapped to y. And
we let f(〈0, 0〉) = f(〈0, 1〉) = x. The details are straightforward and are left to the
reader (or can be found in [18]). 
Remark 6.8. The methods in this section carry over to the general case of frames
Gn for arbitrary n. By an analogous argument, one can prove the logic is simply
Q2 (strong confluence) and the axiom corresponding to “non-n+2-ary-branching”,
which is just a generalization9 of non-branching and non-triple-branching:∨
i≤n+1
✷(✷+Ai →
∨
i6=j
Aj).
7. On the proof of Solovay’s Theorem
In Sections 3 and 4 we showed that PLF (T ) = GL.3 for a wide range of arith-
metical theories T and fragments F . Otherwise put, PLF (T ) gives us the logic
of non-branching GL-frames. Prima facie, one might imagine the possibility of
strategically adding sentences into the fragment F (where F is, e.g. B), so as to
9It is not hard to see that ✷(✷A → B) ∨ ✷(✷+B → A) is equivalent to ✷(✷+A → B) ∨
✷(✷+B → A) over GL.
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obtain the logic of non-triple-branching GL-frames, then that of non-quadruple-
branching GL-frames, and so on. Assuming this could be generalized it would be
possible to define an infinite fragment H, for which PLH(T ) = GL. At that point,
to the extent that Solovay’s Theorem is not already assumed in the determination
of H, we would have a new proof of the result. After all, any non-theorem of GL
can be falsified on some finite, and thus finitely branching, frame. So the witnessing
realization would make use of some finite subset of the fragment, sufficient to falsify
the formula.
What we have shown is that the first step in this process is (almost) possible,
vis-a`-vis Corollary 5.10. Adding the constant for IΣ1 and capitalizing on the well
studied relationship between that theory and PRA, we are able to obtain the logic of
non-triple-branching (and strongly confluent)GL-frames. Two important questions
remain, however, before taking the next step.
The first and most obvious question is what the further constants will be. The
particular case of IΣ1 and PRA is already well studied. Going beyond that may
require some significant arithmetical investigation. In Section 5.2 we isolated what
arithmetical facts are sufficient to hold. So on the proposed strategy it would simply
be a matter of finding a theory and a fragment that satisfy these requirements.
The second, and more curious, question is how to dispense with property C3,
strong confluence. We have seen that the logic of the frame Gn always contains
the formula Q2, and so it will clearly remain in the limit. However Q2 is obviously
not a theorem of GL. Finding constants whose associated provability logics do not
validate Q2 may prove a challenge. Understanding this situation may shed light
on Solovay’s original proof.
8. Interpretability Logics with Restricted Substitutions
Interpretations are used throughout mathematics and logic. Loosely speaking,
an interpretation from a theory V into a theory U is structure preserving map that
translates theorems of V to theorems of U . The notion of interpretability that we
discuss below is grosso modo that of [34] and details can be found in, e.g. [21] or in
[37].
8.1. Interpretability Logics. Interpretability can be seen as a generalization of
provability. By α ✄T β we denote a natural formalized version of the statement
that T + β is interpretable in T + α.
Interpretability Logics are designed to capture the structural behavior of for-
malized interpretability. The language of these logics is that of provability logic
together with a binary modality ✄, orthographically identical to the arithmetical
operator, to model formalized interpretability. And indeed, arithmetical realizations
are extended as expected by imposing that
(A✄B)∗ = A∗ ✄B∗.
For a clear distinction, let FormIL denote the class of modal formulas in language of
interpretability logic and FormGL the standard modal language of basic provability
logic. In analogy with the definition of PL(T ) we define IL(T ), the interpretability
logic of a theory T
IL(T ) := {A ∈ FormIL | ∀∗ T ⊢ A
∗} and ILΓ(T ) := {A ∈ FormIL | ∀∗∈Γ T ⊢ A
∗}.
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By Theorem 1.2 and Footnote 2 we see that provability logics are the same for
all sufficiently strong theories. This is certainly not the case for interpretability
logics, which turn out to be more sensitive to differences between theories. One
such example is the notion of an essential reflexive theory.
A theory is reflexive if it proves the consistency of any finite subpart of it. A
theory is essentially reflexive whenever any finite extension of it is reflexive. The
following theorem is due independently to A. Berarducci and V. Shavrukov. The
definition of ILM will follow below.
Theorem 8.1 (Berarducci [7], Shavrukov [31]). If T is an essentially reflexive and
Σ1 sound theory, then IL(T) = ILM.
However, if a theory is finitely axiomatizable we get a different outcome where,
again, ILP is defined below.
Theorem 8.2 (Visser [36]). If T is finitely axiomatizable, Σ1 sound, and extending
I∆0 + supexp, then IL(T) = ILP.
A prominent problem in formalized interpretability is to determine the maximal
interpretability logic that is contained in any reasonable arithmetical theory.
Definition 8.3. The interpretability logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories,
written IL(All), is the set of formulas ϕ such that for all T and ∗, T ⊢ ϕ∗. Here
we let T range over all reasonable10 arithmetical theories.
Clearly, IL(All) is in the intersection of ILM and ILP but apparently it possesses
a very rich structure (see [26], and [13]). In this paper, it is only important to know
that a certain very weak logic to be defined below is part of IL(PRA).
Fact 8.4. ILW ⊂ IL(PRA)
For most theories that do not fall under Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, the interpretability
logic is unknown. The theory PRA is a notable example: the logic IL(PRA) is still
unknown. The most recent results for IL(PRA) are presented in [9].
PRA is known to be the same as IΣR1 where IΣ
R
n is defined as I∆0+exp plus the
Σn induction rule. See for example [2]. In that paper a proof can also be found for
the following theorem.
Theorem 8.5. IΣRn is reflexive, as is any extension of IΣ
R
n by Σn+1 formulas.
The logical complexity of interpretability is Σ3 and in [32] it is shown that it is
essentially so. However, by a theorem due to Orey and Ha´jek we can often reduce
the Σ3 notion of interpretability to the Π2 notion of Π1-conservativity. A theory V
is Π1-conservative over U , we write U ✄Π1 V , whenever for all Π1 sentences π we
have that [V ⊢ π implies U ⊢ π].
Theorem 8.6 (Orey-Ha´jek). For reflexive theories U and V we have
(U ✄ V ) ⇔ (U ✄Π1 V )
and this equivalence is provable in EA.
10The boundaries are not exactly determined and will depend a bit on the answer. It is
legitimate to think of any theory extending I∆0 + exp.
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One advantage of this characterization is evidently that the logical complexity
of Π1-conservativity is lower than that of interpretability. Another advantage is
that the so-called Π1-conservativity logic is a relatively stable notion. The Π1-
conservativity logic of a theory T is just the set of modal formulas in FormIL that are
provable in T under any arithmetical realization where the ✄ modality is mapped
to ✄Π1 .
Theorem 8.7. For any sound theory T extending IΠ−1 we have that the Π1-
conservativity logic of T is ILM.
The theorem was first proven by Ha´jek and Montagna in [14] and [15] to hold
for any sound theory containing IΣ1. Beklemishev and Visser in [6] lowered the
threshold to the rather weak theory IΠ−1 that allows only induction for parameter
free formulas of complexity Π1. It is well known that PRA extends IΠ
−
1 ([2]).
Remark 8.8. The proof of Theorem 8.7 is rather similar to that of Solovay’s
original proof and again (see Theorem 1.5), the substitutions in the completeness
proof can be taken11 to be Σ2.
The logics ILM and ILP have elegant syntactical presentations. We shall define
them in parts. First, we define a logic IL that is present to all interpretability logics
studied. Next this logic IL is extended by adding more axiom schemata.
(When we write formulas in FormIL we adhere to the following binding conven-
tions. We say that ✄ binds stronger than → but weaker than all other connectives.
Using this convention we can save a lot of brackets.)
Definition 8.9. The logic IL is the smallest set of formulas being closed under the
rules of Necessitation and of Modus Ponens, that contains all tautological formulas
and all instantiations of the following axiom schemata.
L1 ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B)
L2 ✷A→ ✷✷A
L3 ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A
J1 ✷(A→ B)→ A✄B
J2 (A✄B) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A✄ C
J3 (A✄ C) ∧ (B ✄ C)→ A ∨B ✄ C
J4 A✄B → (✸A→ ✸B)
J5 ✸A✄A
Apart from the axiom schemata enumerated in Definition 8.9 we will need con-
sider other axiom schemata too.
M A✄B → A ∧ ✷C ✄B ∧ ✷C
P A✄B → ✷(A✄B)
W A✄B → A✄B ∧✷¬A
If X is a set of axiom schemata we will denote by ILX the logic that arises by
adding the axiom schemata in X to IL.
11Albert Visser (p.c.) notes that close inspection of the proof actually reveals that the substi-
tutions can be taken to be ∆2(IΠ
−
1 ). That is, a Σ2 sentences that is probably in IΠ
−
1 equivalent
to a Π2 sentence.
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8.2. The closed fragment. Because closed formulas in ILW can be reduced to
those of GL ([16]) we can prove that ILB(PRA) is again the logic of linear frames.
Definition 8.10. The logic ILW.3 is obtained by adding the linearity axiom schema
✷(✷A→ B) ∨ ✷(⊡B → A) to ILW.
Theorem 8.11. ILB(PRA) = ILW.3
Proof. We give a translation from formulas ϕ in FormIL to formulas ϕ
tr in FormGL
such that
ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ⇔ GL.3 ⊢ ϕtr (∗)
and
ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕtr. (∗∗)
If we moreover know (∗∗∗) : ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ⇒ ∀ ∗ ∈B PRA ⊢ ϕ∗ we would be done.
For then we have by (∗∗) and (∗∗∗) that
∀ ∗ ∈Sub(B) PRA ⊢ ϕ∗ ↔ (ϕtr)∗
and consequently
∀ ∗ ∈B PRA ⊢ ϕ∗ ⇔
∀ ∗ ∈B PRA ⊢ (ϕtr)
∗
⇔
GL.3 ⊢ ϕtr ⇔
ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ.
We first see that (∗∗∗) holds. Certainly, by Fact 8.4, we have that ILW ⊆
ILB(PRA). Thus it remains to show that PRA ⊢ ✷(✷A
∗ → B∗) ∨ ✷(⊡B∗ → A∗)
for any formulas A and B in FormIL and any ∗∈B. As any formula in the closed
fragment of ILW is equivalent to a formula in the closed fragment of GL (see [16]),
Theorem 3.2 gives us that indeed the linearity axiom holds for the closed fragment
of GL.
Our translation will be the identity translation except for ✄. In that case we
define
(A✄B)tr := ✷(Atr → (Btr ∨✸Btr)).
We first see that we have (∗∗). It is sufficient to show that ILW.3 ⊢ p ✄ q →
✷(p → (q ∨ ✸q)). We reason in ILW.3. An instantiation of the linearity axiom
gives us ✷(✷¬q → (¬p ∨ q)) ∨ ✷((¬p ∨ q) ∧ ✷(¬p ∨ q) → ¬q). The first disjunct
immediately yields ✷(p→ (q ∨✸q)).
In case of the second disjunct we get by propositional logic ✷(q → ✸(p ∧ ¬q))
and thus also ✷(q → ✸p). Now we assume p ✄ q. By W we get p ✄ q ∧ ✷¬p.
Together with ✷(q → ✸p), this gives us p✄⊥, that is ✷¬p. Consequently we have
✷(p→ (q ∨✸q)).
We now prove (∗). By induction on ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ we see that GL.3 ⊢ ϕtr. All
the specific interpretability axioms turn out to be provable under our translation
in GL. The only axioms where the ✷A → ✷✷A axiom scheme is really used is in
J2 and J4. To prove the translation of W we also need L3.
If GL.3 ⊢ ϕtr then certainly ILW.3 ⊢ ϕtr and by (∗∗), ILW.3 ⊢ ϕ. 
We thus see that ILW.3 is an upperbound for IL(PRA). Using the translation
from the proof of Theorem 8.11, it is not hard to see that both the principles P and
M are provable in ILW.3. This tells us that the upperbound is actually not very
informative as we know that IL(PRA) 0 M. By a straight-forward generalization of
Lemma 1.4 we see that choosing larger Γ will generally yield a smaller ILΓ(PRA)
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and thus a sharper upperbound. Subsection 8.4 consists of reflections on just how
large the Γ should be as to refute M in ILΓ(PRA). First we shall include some
observations on a fragment slightly larger than the closed fragment.
8.3. The closed fragment with a constant for IΣ1. If we consider the proof
of Theorem 2.1, we see that it does not make any assumptions on the signature
of the modal logic under considerations. In particular, the theorem still holds
for interpretability logics. In the theorem below we use this to give a semantic
characterization of ILF1(PRA).
In [25] it is established that for a certain frame, that we will denote here by G˜•1,
we have the following equivalence.
∀A ∈ F1 [ G˜•1 |= A ⇔ PRA ⊢ A ] (†)
For the purpose of this paper it is not material to know what exactly the frame G˜•1
looks like and we shall refrain from giving a formal definition. It is only important
to know that G˜•1 is just G
•
1 with some additional accessibility relations to model
the ✄ modality. This, together with the mere equivalence (†) suffices to obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 8.12. ILF1(PRA) = L(G˜
•
1)
Proof. Image-finiteness and definability of separate points is clear as interpretability
logic is an extension of provability logic. Thus, by Theorem 2.1 we obtain the
result. 
In [25], also a logic PIL is given such that we actually have
∀A ∈ F1 [ G˜•1 |= A ⇔ PRA ⊢ A ⇔ PIL ⊢ A ].
This suggests that the following conjecture should not be too hard to prove. In this
conjecture, ILM.4 denotes the logic that arises by joining ILM and GL.4.
Conjecture 8.13. L(G˜•1) = ILM.4
The inclusion L(G˜•1) ⊇ ILM.4 is actually very easy and follows from a direct
verification of the validity of the axioms on G˜•1. The other direction is harder but
not too interesting as we still have M ∈ ILF1(PRA).
8.4. Fragments for refuting M in ILΓ(PRA). In [37] it is shown that IL(PRA) 0
A✄✸B → ✷(A✄✸B). It is easy to see that ILM ⊢ A✄✸B → ✷(A✄✸B). This
implies that M is certainly not derivable in IL(PRA). We can also find explicit
realizations that violate M, as the following lemma tells us.
Lemma 8.14. For n ≥ 1, we have that IL(IΣRn ) 0 M.
Proof. We define a realization ∗ such that IΣRn 0 (p✄ q → p ∧ ✷r ✄ q ∧ ✷r)
∗.
It is well-known that IΣRn ( IΣn ( IΣ
R
n+1 and that, for every n≥1, IΣn is finitely
axiomatized. Let σn be the single sentence axiomatizing IΣn. It is also known that
(for n ≥ 1) IL(IΣn) = ILP and that ILP 0 p✄ q → p∧✷r✄ q ∧✷r. Thus, for any
n≥1 we can find αn, βn and γn such that
IΣn 0 αn ✄ βn → αn ∧ ✷γn ✄ βn ∧ ✷γn.
Note that
EA ⊢ αn ✄IΣn βn ↔ σn ∧ αn ✄IΣRn σn ∧ βn
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and
EA ⊢ ✷IΣnγn ↔ ✷IΣRn (σn → γn).
Thus, we have
IΣRn 0 σn ∧ αn ✄ σn ∧ βn → σn ∧ αn ∧ ✷(σn → γn)✄ σn ∧ βn ∧ ✷(σn → γn)
and we can take p∗ = σn ∧ αn, q
∗ = σn ∧ βn and r
∗ = σn → γn. 
We see that the realizations used in the proof of Lemma 8.14 get higher and
higher complexities. The complexity is certainly higher than Σ2.
By Theorem 1 from [9] (Theorem 12.1.1 from [24]) we know that for α, β ∈ Σ2
we have
PRA ⊢ (α✄ β)→ ((α ∧ ✷γ)✄ (β ∧ ✷γ))
for any sentence γ. This translates to ILΣ2(PRA) ⊢ M and indicates that an arith-
metical completeness proof for IL(PRA) can not work with only Σ2-realizations.
For IΣRn , n ≥ 2 we know that IL(IΣ
R
n ) ⊂ ILM. This follows from the next
lemma.
Lemma 8.15. ILΣ2(IΣ
R
n ) = IL∆n+1(IΣ
R
n ) = ILM whenever n ≥ 2.
Proof. We shall use that the logic of Π1-conservativity for theories containing IΠ
−
1
is ILM as mentioned in Theorem 8.7.
If, for two classes of sentences we have X ⊆ Y , then ILY (T) ⊆ ILX(T). We will
thus show that ILΣ2(IΣ
R
n ) ⊆ ILM and ILM ⊆ IL∆n+1(IΣ
R
n ).
First, we prove by induction on the complexity of a modal formula A that for all
∗∈∆n+1 IΣ
R
n ⊢ A
∗
Π1
↔ A∗
✄
and that the logical complexity of A∗Π1 is at most ∆n+1.
The basis is trivial and the only interesting induction step is whenever A = (B✄C).
We reason in IΣRn :
(B ✄ C)∗
✄
↔def.
IΣRn +B
∗
✄
✄ IΣRn + C
∗
✄
↔i.h.
IΣRn +B
∗
Π1
✄ IΣRn + C
∗
Π1
↔Orey-Ha´jek
IΣRn +B
∗
Π1
✄Π1 IΣ
R
n + C
∗
Π1
↔def.
(B ✄ C)∗Π1
Note that we have access to the Orey-Ha´jek characterization as B∗Π1 is at most
of complexity ∆n+1 and thus IΣ
R
n +B
∗
Π1
is a reflexive theory by Theorem 8.5. Also
note that (B ✄ C)∗Π1 is a Π2-sentence and thus certainly ∆n+1 whenever n ≥ 2.
If now ILM ⊢ A then IΣRn ⊢ A
∗
Π1
and thus whenever ∗ ∈ ∆n+1, IΣ
R
n ⊢ A
∗
✄
and
ILM ⊆ IL∆n+1(IΣ
R
n ).
If ILM 0 A then by Remark 8.8 for some ∗ ∈ Σ2 we have IΣ
R
n 0 A
∗
Π1
whence
IΣRn 0 A
∗
✄
. We may conclude that ILΣ2(IΣ
R
n ) ⊆ ILM. 
Theorem 8.16. IL(PRA) ⊂ ILM
Proof. Although the proof of Lemma 8.15 does not give us that ILΣ2(IΣ
R
1 ) =
ILM, it does give us that ILΣ2(IΣ
R
1 ) ⊆ ILM. By earlier observations we saw that
IL(PRA) 6= ILM. 
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9. Future research
We have seen that adding a constant for IΣ1 to PRA is sufficient to obtain a non-
trivial provability logic. By a Theorem of Leivant it is known that IΣ1 ≡< 2 >EA ⊤.
An interesting fragment to consider next for PRA would be the closed fragment
together with the set of constants
{(< 1 >EA< 2 >EA)
n⊤ | n ∈ ω}
or variants thereof.
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